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Abstract 
Focusing on the issue of food safety, we consider a framework of repeated purchases 
under the scenario of imperfect information on product quality (adverse selection and 
experience goods). A firm in a northern country can more easily detect tainted products 
than can a southern one. When imports are banned, the northern firm does not always 
signal the actual quality of its products. Competition from imports may lead the northern 
firm to test the quality of its products as a way to differentiate itself from foreign 
competitors. Consumers benefit from the disclosure of information on quality, even 
though borders are open to products of uncertain quality. However, competition from 
imports also increases the cost of signaling high quality. This can be detrimental to the 
welfare of the importing country when the cost of detection is high. 
 
Key words: adverse selection, north-south trade, signaling, trade. 
 
  
 
QUALITY SIGNALING AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE IN FOOD PRODUCTS 
Introduction 
Trade liberalization has put on the shelves an increasingly large number of products 
from more distant and more varied locations. The arrival of less familiar goods has 
sometimes resulted in concerns about the “globalization” of the economy. Consumers 
often maintain that they are not as well informed about the quality of imports as they are 
about the quality of domestic products. The issue is particularly sensitive in the food 
sector. For example, several American organizations have expressed concern about the 
safety of food imported from developing countries and have lobbied against international 
agreements that would help facilitate access to U.S. markets for imports, such as the 
special provisions of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement for developing countries 
(Silverglade 1998). On the other hand, developing and transition countries frequently 
voice their displeasure at sanitary standards requiring specific detection techniques, some 
of which are out of their reach (Henson et al. 2000).1 These countries claim that recent 
requirements for quality certification present a de facto ban on access to European Union 
(EU) and U.S. markets for their products. The consequences go far beyond the food 
sector. During the Uruguay Round, developing countries saw access to northern markets 
in the food sector as the main motivation for participating in multilateral agreements, 
where they felt they otherwise had a lot to lose (e.g., on intellectual property). Because 
they feel that, in spite of lower tariffs, their access to the northern market did not improve 
because of technical requirements on quality control, they see little interest in 
participating in a new round of multilateral negotiations.  
 Granting access to northern markets without fueling consumers’ worries is a key 
issue for a future trade agreement. The aim of this paper is to assess possible effects of 
trade liberalization when producers and consumers are imperfectly informed about food 
safety. We focus on a case where a country that is able to implement sophisticated 
sanitary control procedures (referred to as the “northern” country) opens its domestic 
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market to goods produced in a “southern” country, where efficient means for detecting 
the actual quality of exports are lacking. The term “southern” is used for clarity of 
exposition and has no particular geographical meaning. Indeed, in order to focus on the 
information-related mechanisms, we do not assume that southern products are less safe 
on average; we assume only that detection of tainted products is more difficult for the 
southern country. 
Our main results are the following. First, under autarky, the northern firm does not 
always detect the safety of its products. Consequently, low-quality (i.e., hazardous) 
products are sometimes sold, and the market equilibrium is thus characterized by an 
informational inefficiency. Second, opening the northern market to imports from the 
southern country may increase domestic welfare, even if the southern producer is unable 
to detect its product quality. Potential competition may increase the incentive for the 
northern producer to acquire and disclose more information. However, competition from 
the southern firm makes it costlier for the northern firm to signal high quality. For large 
probabilities of contamination and a large cost of detection, trade liberalization may 
result in market closure and have an overall negative effect on domestic welfare. 
We focus on a case of quality detection by producers that are initially uninformed 
about the quality of their products and where there is an asymmetry in the acquisition of 
information between two countries. This differs from the literature on international trade 
under asymmetric information, where sellers most often are aware of their product 
quality. Grossman and Shapiro (1988) and Falvey (1989) focus on reputation effects 
when producers choose their quality (i.e., moral hazard). Donnenfeld (1986) and 
Donnenfeld, Weber, and Ben-Zion (1985) deal with the issue of consumers who are more 
informed about the quality of domestic products than about the quality of foreign ones. 
Haucap, Wey, and Barmbold (2000) investigate the role of imperfect information as an 
explanation for intra-industry trade. We investigate the interrelations between 
competition and acquisition/revelation of information. In our case, the firms’ information 
is endogenous—producers chose to detect quality or not—and their decision is influenced 
by trade. Our framework differs from Daughety and Reinganum (1997), who also focus 
on the signaling strategies of two competing firms with uninformed buyers but assume 
that quality levels are correlated across firms. 
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The Model 
 We begin with a simple, stylized framework. In the northern country, there are n 
identical consumers, and a single firm represents producers. There is a single firm and no 
consumers in the southern country. Production, trade, and consumption take place over 
two periods. A common discount factor d <1 is used for valuing the second-period gains 
relative to the first-period ones. Agents are risk neutral. For both firms, the marginal cost 
of production, c (identical in both countries) is constant, regardless of the quality of the 
product. There are only two product qualities. We assume that quality depends on a 
random contamination of the product beyond the firms’ control. We also assume that the 
quality of output from a given firm remains unchanged in the second period. This 
corresponds to a case where contamination affects the plant or other structural production 
or marketing conditions, and we assume that a contaminated plant results in a low-quality 
product with a probability equal to one. Each firm offers either a high-quality product 
with probability l, or a low-quality product with probability (1-l). This probability is the 
same in both countries.2 The n consumers purchase either zero or one unit of the good in 
each period. Their willingness to pay for a safe product is qh>0. The willingness to pay 
for tainted products is zero, so that there is no demand when the individual consumer is 
aware of the low quality of the product. We assume that qh>c, meaning high-quality 
products are always purchased when the consumer is informed of the quality. 
 “North” and “south” only differ in the ability of firms to implement quality tests and 
therefore to get private information about contamination of the plant and the subsequent 
product quality.3  In the northern country, we assume that the firm has the ability to 
ascertain perfectly whether the plant is safe or not at the beginning of period 1, provided 
that it incurs a (sunk) cost k in testing. The southern country cannot detect quality 
because of the lack of technology and human capital and is therefore unaware of the 
actual quality of its output in the first period. In the first period, consumers are not aware 
of the quality of the product available in the market by their own observation. Consumers 
do not observe whether or not the northern firm conducted a quality test and therefore do 
not observe the result of the test.4 But as l, k, and c are assumed to be common 
knowledge, consumers can anticipate the conditions under which the firm has an 
incentive to get this private information by testing and to signal it through an introductory 
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price. They can therefore identify a credible signal that the firm is of high quality and can 
use the information in their purchasing decision. 
 The timing of events is as follows:  
1.  In the first period, the northern firm decides whether or not to detect its 
quality. We assume that the test provides this information before the output is 
produced. If a firm does not produce after detecting its quality, it experiences 
no marginal cost of production, so that the only cost incurred in the absence of 
production is k. 
2. Consumers observe prices and decide whether or not to purchase. At the end 
of the first period, each consumer is aware of the quality of the product con-
sumed (i.e., quality is known after consumption, a case of experience goods). 
Through word of mouth, the quality of the goods consumed in the first period 
becomes common knowledge. In the second period, all agents are informed of 
the quality of the first-period suppliers, and consumers choose high-quality 
products. 
These assumptions might seem restrictive; however, they make it possible to focus 
on the linkage between trade and quality revelation. By considering identical costs and 
probability of contamination, we ignore comparative advantage effects other than the 
informational one. By assuming an inelastic demand, we ignore the effect of extra 
competition resulting from trade liberalization on the Harberger triangles (i.e., 
deadweight loss) caused by market power. By considering only the northern market, we 
ignore the effect of economies of scale due to the fixed cost and the larger market under 
bilateral opening. By considering that only safe products are in demand, we ignore the 
welfare effect of a potential increase in product diversity caused by trade. 
 
Autarky 
 When imports are banned, the northern firm is the only possible supplier in both 
periods. Before posting any price, the firm chooses among (i) production without quality 
detection, (ii) production with quality detection, and (iii) no production. By observing 
production, consumers cannot immediately distinguish between a firm that has not 
conducted a test, a firm that detected low quality, and a firm that detected high quality. 
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The first-period price may, however, convey information to consumers. This price is 
determined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the subgame that starts after the decision 
regarding detection. In the second period, the firm sets a price p2=qh if it turns out that its 
products, experienced by consumers, are of high quality, and no price otherwise. Next, 
we describe strategies (i), (ii), and (iii). 
Strategy (i). If the nondetection strategy is chosen, the firm expects a profit 
n[p-c+ld(qh-c)] by posting a first-period price p. This profit is maximum with a price 
equal to the n consumer’s willingness to pay in the first period, i.e., p=lqh. The maximum 
expected profit with this strategy is PC given by equation (1). The consumer’s expected 
surplus is zero, so that the domestic welfare WC , defined as the sum of the consumer’s 
and domestic firm’s surplus, is PC.  
 ( ))cq(cqnW hhCC -+-=P= ldl . (1) 
Strategy (ii). Detection involves a cost k but allows a firm to signal high quality. We 
represent this signal by a low introductory price. This common assumption encompasses 
various signaling strategies that involve a first-period investment in reputation (Shapiro 
1983). The firm that chooses the detection strategy has no incentive to post the first-
period price lqh that conveys no additional information. Such a strategy would be strictly 
dominated by strategy (i) where the firm does not incur the cost k (i.e., PC – k<PC). The 
signaling price must convince consumers both that quality detection was undertaken and 
that the firm offers high-quality goods. Because there is no demand for low-quality 
goods, a price lower than marginal cost is the only way to signal high-quality products.5 
Each individual consumer interprets the low price as the firm’s commitment to be present 
on the market in the second period. As a result, consumers modify their expectation about 
the product’s quality. An equilibrium is said to be separating if the high-quality seller 
posts a price pS that it could not select if it was of low quality or if it did not detect its 
quality. Here, the highest possible signaling price is  
 S hp c- (q )cld e=  - - , (2) 
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with e close to 0. Neither an informed low-quality firm nor an uninformed one can expect 
positive profits by posting pS. A firm informed of its low quality does not post a price 
lower than marginal cost in the first period (as it expects no sales in the second period 
when consumers are informed). A firm that has not detected its quality expects second-
period profits with a probability l and can consider a first-period loss. However, the 
lowest possible first-period price for an uninformed firm is p=c - ld(qh - c), such that its 
expected profit p=n(p - c+ld(qh - c)) is zero. Therefore, the price pS is a credible signal for 
a firm with a high-quality output. Rational expectations allow consumers to anticipate 
when the firm has an ex ante incentive to detect and signal its quality, so that any price 
higher than pS would then be understood as a low-quality signal. A firm with low-quality 
products (or with no information) thus does not post any price. 
The intertemporal profit of the high-quality firm that detects and signals quality is 
ph=n[(pS - c)+d(qh - c)] - k. If the firm is of low quality, a possibility occurring with a 
probability of (1-l), its profit is pL= -k. Before choosing to detect its quality, the domestic 
firm therefore knows that its overall average expected profit is PB.  
 ( ) kcqn hLhB ---+-=-+=P )()1()1( dlelpllp . (3) 
When the firm detects its quality, consumers experience a positive surplus in the first 
period, because the signaling price is lower than their willingness to pay qh, and they 
experience no surplus in the second period. The intertemporal consumer surplus is 
SCB=nl (qh - pS). The sum of SCB and the expected profit PB given by equation (3) gives 
the domestic welfare WB for the separating equilibrium  
 k)cq)((nW hB --+= dl 1 . (4) 
 Strategy (iii). Finally, if the firm does not produce, its profit and the consumer’s 
surplus are zero. 
 The firm selects the most profitable strategy between (i), (ii), and (iii). We can 
characterize the behavior of the northern firm under autarky by Proposition 1, illustrated 
by Figure 1. The X-axis represents the probability l of supplying high-quality products  
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FIGURE 1.  Quality detection and first-period pricing strategies under autarky 
 
and the Y-axis represents the cost of quality testing k. The relative values of l and k 
determine the firm’s optimal strategy. 
PROPOSITION 1. Under autarky, in area A of Figure 1, there is no production. In area 
B, the domestic firm chooses to detect its quality and, if it is of high quality, posts a first-
period price pS. In area C, the domestic firm does not detect its quality and posts a first-
period price of lqh. (See the proof in Appendix A).  
In area A, imperfect information results in a market closure. The low probability l 
implies a low willingness to pay for such an uncertain quality, and the relatively high cost 
of detection k deters the firm from acquiring information, so that the firm cannot expect a 
positive intertemporal profit. In area B, the firm chooses to detect quality in order to 
avoid a market closure (or a low profit in the absence of detection). In area C, the 
probability of getting high-quality products l is high and the firm has no incentive to 
implement a costly quality detection procedure given the high value of the consumer’s 
willingness to pay lqh for a product of uncertain quality. In brief, under autarky, the 
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functioning of the market may result in the absence of quality revelation in the first 
period and/or in a market closure. For relatively low values of k in area C, the welfare WC 
given by equation (1) is lower than the welfare with quality detection WB given by 
equation (4). It means that the firm does not detect its quality, even though it would be 
socially preferable to do so. 
 
Trade Liberalization 
In this section, the northern (hereafter “domestic”) country opens its domestic market 
to the southern (hereafter “foreign”) firm. We begin with the different pricing strategies 
in the two situations (detection/nondetection) before considering the choice of quality 
detection. 
Pricing Strategies When the Domestic Firm Does Not Detect Product Quality 
First, assume that the domestic firm does not detect product quality. Firms in both 
countries therefore have the same information regarding their quality and they compete in 
price over two periods. The repeated purchase framework and the exit of low-quality 
producers at the end of the first period allow sophisticated pricing strategies, even though 
the two firms have the same initial characteristics in costs, expected quality, and available 
information. 
If both firms select the same price in period 1, consumers visit any seller and each 
firm sells a quantity n/2. The second-period price depends on the quality observed by 
consumers in period 1. With a probability (1-l)2, both firms offered low quality in period 
1 and there is no trade in period 2. With a probability l2, both firms offered high quality 
in period 1 and competition results in a price equal to c in period 2. With a probability 
l(1-l), only one firm offered high-quality products in period 1 and posts a price qh , 
capturing all consumers in period 2. Thus, for each firm posting a price p in period 1, the 
expected profit is pD:  
 ))(1())(2/()( cqncpnppp hjiD --+-=== ldlp . (5) 
The lowest first-period price that firms are willing to set is such that their intertem-
poral profit is zero, which leads to a price p : 
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 ))(1(2 cqcp h---= ldl . (6) 
 Now, consider what happens when firms post different prices in period 1. Assume that 
firm i posts a price pi and firm j posts a price pj =pi+e , with e>0. Firm i captures all 
consumers in period 1. If consumers determine that i is of high quality, they will choose 
between firm i products and firm j products of unknown quality in period 2. This limits 
the price that the seller i can set in period 2 to p2:6 
 ( )hh qcqMinp )1(,2 l-+= . (7) 
The expected profit of firm i is therefore pI: 
 ( ) ( ) hhiiijii qcifqcpncpcpnppp /)1()(),( 2 >-+-=-+-=> lldldlp . (8) 
 By posting a price pi+e , firm j makes no sale in period 1 but sells its product in 
period 2 if consumers find that firm i is of low quality. As nobody experienced its 
product in period 1, the firm j posts a price lqh and gets a profit p j, given by equation (9): 
 )cq)((n hj --= lldp 1 . (9) 
We now turn to the choice between possible pricing strategies. Let p~  be the price 
for which the profit resulting from selling in the first period is equal to the profit resulting 
from betting only on second-period sales (i.e., pi(pi,pj>pi)=pj ):  
 ccp )1(~ ld --= . (10) 
Figure 2 (above the curve k2) illustrates Proposition 2 and shows the firm’s decision in 
the absence of detection.6 
PROPOSITION 2. In area A, Figure 2, there is a market closure. In area C1, both firms 
post a first-period price p . In area C2, both firms post a first-period price p~ . In area 
C3, one firm posts a price p~  and the other posts a price e+p~  in the first period. (See the 
proof and the technical explanations for Figure 2 in Appendix B). 
In areas A and C1, firms cannot expect positive profits in the second period unless 
they sold in the first period. In area A, no price can offset the low probability of getting  
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FIGURE 2.  Quality detection and first-period pricing strategies under free trade 
 
high quality, which deters consumers from purchasing. In area C1, the benefit of a low 
first-period price p  resulting from price competition outweighs the high probability of 
acquiring a low-quality product for consumers. Trade occurs at p  since the expected 
consumer surplus is positive. In area C2, both firms compete with the same price p~  in 
the first period. They expect a positive profit because of the probability l(1-l) of posting 
a monopoly price in period 2. In area C3, one firm will post p~  and the other firm will 
post a higher price e+p~ , not entering the market in the first period and betting on 
capturing the whole demand in the second period, should the first period seller turn out to 
be of low quality. 
Pricing Strategies When the Domestic Firm Detects Product Quality 
 Now, consider the case where the domestic firm decides to detect its quality. If it 
turns out to be of high quality, it posts a first-period price e-p , i.e., the highest price that 
is not imitable by a seller of unknown quality. At this price, all consumers purchase from 
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the domestic firm in period 1. In the second period, the threat of consumers turning to the 
foreign firm limits the price set by the domestic firm to p2 defined by equation (7). The 
expected profit of the domestic firm is therefore  
 ( )
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The foreign firm expects to be driven out of the market if its competitor signals its 
high-quality product. Consequently, it will select a price that will make it possible to 
capture consumers’ demand if the domestic firm turns out to offer low quality. The 
foreign firm’s optimal strategy is therefore to post c - e  if it is lower than the consumers’ 
willingness to pay (area B3), to post lqh otherwise if it allows positive profits (area B2), 
and to post no price in other cases (area B1). 
Detection or Nondetection Strategy 
The described pricing strategies provide conditions under which the domestic firm 
decides whether or not to detect its quality. Proposition 3 describes the firm’s decisions.  
  PROPOSITION 3. The domestic firm detects its quality in areas B1, B2, and B3 of 
Figure 2. It signals its high quality by a price e-p  or posts no price if it is of low quality. 
In areas A, C1, C2, and C3, the domestic firm does not detect quality and its price 
strategies are given in Proposition 2. (See the proof in Appendix B).  
In areas B1, B2, and B3, the domestic firm has an incentive to detect its products for 
driving out the foreign firm of the market, which occurs with domestic high-quality 
products. In B1, the foreign firm never enters the market, and in B2 and B3, it sells its 
product only if the domestic one is of low quality. 
Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization 
We now turn to the comparison of signaling strategies and welfare between autarky 
and free trade. Trade liberalization modifies the range of parameters for which the 
domestic firm signals its quality. Figure 3 shows that under free trade, the area where the 
domestic firm signals its quality is larger in the l dimension and smaller in the k 
dimension. In areas b and B3, opening borders results in quality revelation under free  
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FIGURE 3.  Welfare implications of trade liberalization, northern country 
 
trade, while this was not the case under autarky. Competition with a foreign firm provides 
an incentive for acquiring more information for the domestic firm, because detection 
helps to drive the foreign firm out of the market if the domestic firm is of high quality. 
On the other hand, in areas a1 and a2, free trade results in nonrevelation when there was 
revelation under autarky. The reason is that trade liberalization increases the first-period 
loss necessary to credibly signal quality. 
In Figure 3, domestic welfare remains unchanged in the white area, decreases in the 
hatched area, and increases in the gray area when trade is liberalized. In areas A1, B1, B2’ 
and C3 (white area), trade liberalization may result in a transfer from the domestic firm to 
consumers, but the strategies of detection and signaling remain unchanged. That is, 
domestic welfare is the same when imports are either banned or allowed. In areas a1 and 
a2, (hatched area), the overall domestic welfare decreases with trade liberalization. In a1 
the domestic firm does not supply the market, and in area a2 it does not detect its quality 
Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products / 13 
under free trade, while it used to do so in autarky. In areas b and B3, trade liberalization 
benefits the domestic country for two reasons. First, competition compels the domestic 
firm to detect and signal product quality (this holds for values of l, which resulted in the 
absence of detection under autarky). This has a positive effect on welfare. Second, the 
consumer is now able to capture a strictly positive surplus from trading with the foreign 
firm (area B3) when the domestic firm failed to offer high-quality products. In area C1’ 
and C2, trade liberalization also results in an increase in domestic welfare. Competition 
in period 1 leads to detecting quality of both the domestic and foreign firms. Consumers 
benefit from the extra information, since at the end of period 1 they have tested two 
products rather than only one under autarky. Finally, in area A2, trade liberalization also 
leads to an increase in domestic welfare. Under autarky there was a market closure, while 
under free trade the domestic welfare is similar to that in area C. Free trade makes market 
closure less likely to happen (market closure is limited to values of l below lˆˆ , with ll ˆˆˆ < ; 
see Appendix B). Appendix C provides the value of the welfare in the different areas in 
figure 3. 
 
Robustness and Extensions 
In defining the analytical framework, we made restrictive assumptions in order to 
focus on the effects of trade liberalization on quality revelation mechanisms. While the 
shape and the size of the various areas in the figures differ, most basic mechanisms 
remain unchanged when we introduce the following changes:  
1.  Different production costs and different l according to the origin. This 
introduces some comparative advantage in the analysis, makes it possible to 
integrate more realistic (but more classical) sources of gain from trade, but 
does not alter the mechanisms illustrated here;  
2. A more elastic demand. A consequence is that an increase of welfare coming 
from trade liberalization may appear in areas a1 and a2 in Figure 3, when the 
reduction of the deadweight loss outweighs the absence of quality detection. It 
means that trade liberalization would more often have positive effects for a 
country in spite of trading with a country with an informational handicap;  
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3. A different willingness to pay for safety across countries. This could be taken 
into account by studying a bilateral opening context. Under our assumptions, 
consumers in the foreign country would also benefit from trade liberalization, 
and the domestic firm would have more possibility for quality revelation due 
to a larger market for the same fixed cost of detection;  
4. The case where buyers can observe the result of the quality test (linked to a 
public process for labeling or certification). This obviously modifies the need 
for price signaling and subsequently the results on prices and welfare. How-
ever, this assumption does not modify the nature of the results regarding the 
link between competition and revelation. 
The case of a more competitive structure could also be treated within this framework. 
Under the above assumptions, it is noteworthy that if several foreign firms enter the domestic 
market, trade liberalization would lead to a greater incentive for a firm to reveal quality due 
to the competition pressure, as profits in the absence of detection tend toward zero.  
 
Conclusion 
Using a stylized representation of reality, we highlighted some economic mecha-
nisms that operate when there is a possibility of trading contaminated products and their 
possible consequences for trade policy. We showed that opening a country’s market to 
imports of unknown quality may have a positive effect on domestic welfare, in the 
absence of comparative advantage in production costs and economies of scale, with 
similar average product quality in both countries, even when the foreign country is 
characterized by an informational handicap. However, trade liberalization results in a 
higher cost for the domestic firm to signal its product quality. It may lead to a decrease in 
domestic welfare when the probability of acquiring safe products is low, when the cost of 
quality control is high, and when the domestic firm facing competition is deterred from 
detecting its product quality. Imports of unknown quality may expand the possibility for 
market closure and for commercialization of tainted products simply because of 
information effects.  
Even though the empirical lessons that can be drawn from this exercise are limited 
by the assumptions that were made for keeping the model simple, the finding that 
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opening the market to imports may result in an increase in the welfare of the importing 
country deserves more exploration in the present debate on trade liberalization.8 
In the food sector, decisionmakers face criticism from consumer groups when they 
allow import of tainted products from developing countries that lack sophisticated 
infrastructures for safety control. They also face complaints from developing countries, 
which argue that rich countries’ quality detection and certification requirements act as 
nontariff barriers. Several empirical cases have shown that quality certification 
requirements were major impediments to developing countries’ exports, with very 
marginal impacts on consumer protection.9 Because vested interests are often hidden in 
the guise of consumer protection, and because of the need to grant developing countries 
fair access to markets, several economists recently have argued for more cost-benefit 
analysis in defining sanitary and phytosanitary rules for imports (Anderson, McRae, and 
Wilson 2001). In such future analyses, the effect of potential or actual competition from 
foreign producers on quality detection should be considered.  
 There is evidence that competition from imports has provided an incentive for 
informational differentiation. During the last few years, EU firms have made an 
increasing use of labels and certifications and have signaled the absence of genetic 
engineering and respect for ethical or environmental standards as a way to differentiate 
themselves and to cope with lower tariffs. Not all of these cases correspond to the 
assumptions considered in this paper, but several of the mechanisms illustrated here 
remain valid in a more realistic economy where sellers are not always informed of 
product quality by suppliers. The fact that, in this stylized framework, consumers benefit 
from having more information compared to the case under autarky suggests that more 
consideration should be given to informational effects when assessing the gains of trade 
liberalization.
  
 
Endnotes 
1. The ability to detect and/or identify pathogens is a frequent obstacle for southern countries to comply 
with northern countries’ standards. For example, when the European Union notified the World Trade 
Organization that it would seek lower levels of aflatoxin in imported food, India and several other 
developing countries complained that they did not have the technology for detecting such low levels. 
It is estimated that the EU requirement will reduce African exports of cereals, dried fruits, and nuts to 
Europe by two-thirds (World Bank 2001). More generally, the Bank estimates that the creation of an 
administrative system for compliance, conformity assessment, quality testing, and certification is the 
largest potential obstacle for developing exporters, among technical standards. 
2. The assumption that the probability of producing low-quality products is higher in the “southern” 
country is not supported by evidence. Data from U.S. public agencies show that food imports are no 
more frequently tainted than are domestic food products. For some contaminants (chemical residues), 
imports even turn out to be less frequently tainted (Stark 1999). 
3. The assumption that quality is structurally linked to the plant or the production process and that 
quality detection relies on the testing on the installations and equipments is consistent with the main 
procedure used in the food sector, the Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Point (HACCP), which 
relies on monitoring sanitation procedures at different stages of the production process. This is also 
the main assumption behind ISO9000 (International Standardization Office) certification. Unlike our 
simplified model, neither HACCP nor ISO certification provides a 100 percent probability that the 
product will be of high quality. 
4. Many safety/quality tests are conducted during the process of production and are difficult to 
communicate to consumers. This is the case with the HACCP procedure. Moreover, most of the time, 
consumers do not have the opportunity to inspect plants.  
5. Any price higher than the marginal cost could be selected by a low-quality seller. There is no 
possibility for a price higher than the perfect-information price (i.e., qh) to signal high-quality 
products, which differs from the framework used by Bagwell and Staiger (1989), Bagwell and 
Riordan (1991) or Ellingsen (1997).  
6. The second period price p2 is the threshold price that makes consumers indifferent between 
purchasing high-quality products from firm i and products of uncertain quality from firm j, sold at 
price c. The expression of p2 comes from the constraint qh – p2=lqh – c forl>c/?qh. For l<c?/qh , no 
consumer is ready to buy products of uncertain quality, so that the high-quality seller can post a price 
p2=qh. 
7. We restrict our analysis to cases where p p>% , namely, for qh>2c. It means that posting p% allows a 
positive expected profit. This condition insures the equilibrium existence. If p p>%  an inexistence of 
equilibrium arises. Indeed, firms increase their profits by decreasing prices (i.e., capturing the whole 
demand) until reaching p , where intertemporal profits are zero. However, this is not an equilibrium, 
because each firm has a unilateral incentive to increase price. This strategy leads to the absence of 
sales in the first period and to a positive expected profit in the second period if the other firm fails to 
provide high-quality goods. 
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8. Note that in cases where trade liberalization results in a decrease in welfare, i.e., areas a1 and a2 in 
Figure 3, one could consider appropriate public intervention, such as subsidies to the detection costs. 
9. Examples include the EU requirement of plant certifications in the fish sector in Eastern Africa 
(Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah 2000); U.S. requirements for HACCP certification of meat and 
seafood products (Cato and Dos Santos 1998); and EU requirements for the detection of aflatoxin 
residues that might statistically avoid 1.4 liver cancer deaths in a billion but cause a 72 percent drop in 
African exports of peanuts (Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 1999).
  
 
Appendix A: Autarky 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 Under our assumptions, the domestic firm selects a strategy expected to be the most profitable, 
between (i) production without detection, (ii) detection and production if high quality, and (iii) no quality 
detection or production. Given the price strategies described in the autarky section, the absence of detection 
results in an expected profit PC given by equation (1). Detection allows an expected profit PB given by 
equation (3), and no production results in a zero profit. The comparison of profits leads to 
 0 (1 ) ( ) ,B hk n q cl l dP ³ Û < - -  (12) 
 2 ( )
B C h h
k n c q q cP ³ P Û < - l - l dé ùë û , (13) 
 ˆ0
( )
C
h h
c
q q c
P ³ Û l ³ l =
+ d -
. (14) 
 Detection is selected if conditions (12) and (13) are satisfied, which is equivalent to 
k<k1=Min[ln(1-l)d(qh-c), n(c-lqh-l2d(qh-c))], and which is verified in area B in Figure 1. Production 
without detection is selected if equation (13) is violated and equation (14) is satisfied, which corresponds to 
area C in Figure 1. Market closure emerges when equations (12) and (14) are violated, which corresponds 
to area A. This is expressed in Proposition 1. The equilibrium strategies are consistent with the elimination 
of out-of-equilibrium strategies according to the Malaith, Okino-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993) 
refinement criterion (see also Overgaard 1993). 
  
 
Appendix B: Trade Liberalization 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Betting on second-period profits to avoid direct price competition is only possible if lqh>c. If l<c/qh , 
firms compete in the first period and post 2 (1 ) ( )
h
p c q c= - l - l d -  so that expected intertemporal profits 
are zero. Trade at this price is possible if the expected consumer surplus SC is nonnegative: 
2 ˆˆ( ) ( ) 0h hSC p n q p q c= l - + l d - ³ Û l ³ lé ùë û  where 
ˆˆ
l  is defined by equation (15). If 
ˆˆ
l < l , the price 
p  does not allow consumers to expect a positive surplus, and there is a market closure: 
 
22 ( ) [ 2 ( )] 4 ( )ˆˆ
2 ( )
h h h h h
h
q q c q q c c q c
q c
+ d - - + d - - d -
l =
d -
. (15) 
 If /
h
c ql > , inter temporal strategies are possible. By definition of p% , competing firms have no 
incentive to set a price below p% , as it would lead to lower profits than the “betting on second period” 
strategy. Depending on the probability of remaining present in the second period, two possible equilibria 
must be considered: 
(i)  the market sharing equilibrium, when both firms post price p% and get the same positive profit 
pD given by equation (16). pD is positive because p p>% , the break-even price under duopoly 
(see endnote 9): 
 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
2
D
h
n
p p c n q cp l l d= - + - -% % ; (16) 
(ii)  the “temporal differentiation equilibrium,” when one firm posts p%  and the other posts p + e% , 
a case where both firms expect the same positive profit pj given by equation (9).  
It is easy to see that ( ) 1/ 2D jpp > p Û l <% . Under this condition, ( , )p p% %  is the equilibrium and both 
firms expect a positive profit ( )D jpp > p% . By posting any lower price p K-% , the firm i captures the whole 
demand but obtains a profit ( )i jp K nKp - = p -% , with pj  given by equation (9). As ( )
D
j pp < p % , 
lowering prices is not a profitable deviation. By posting any higher price p K+% , the firm j, betting on 
second-period profits, obtains a profit ( )Dj pp < p %  and therefore has no incentive to deviate from price p% .  
If 1/ 2l > , ( )D jpp < p% , the situation where firm i posts p% and firm j posts p + e% , both expecting a 
profit pj, is an equilibrium. Firm j has no incentive to post price p% as it would allow a profit ( )
D
jpp < p% . 
Cutting the price even more (in order to catch the whole demand) and posting any price p~ -K results in a 
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profit ( ) ( (1 ) )
h
p K n p K c qp - = - - + l - l% % = jp -nK< jp . Firm i cannot imitate firm j and post p + e% , 
because its profit would be ( ) ( ) ( / 2)D Dp p np + e = p + e% % , which is still lower than pj for small values of e 
(remember that 0e ® in Proposition 2). Finally, firm i has no incentive to set a price p K+% higher than its 
competitor’s price because this holds its own profit constant ( ) jp Kp + = p%  and slightly increases its 
competitor’s profit, ( ) jp np + e = p + e% . 
Technical Explanations for Figure 2 
The shift from situation (i) to (ii) in the preceding section takes place when l reaches the critical value 
l=1/2 as can be seen in Figure 2. The explanation lies in the opposite effects of l on expected profits. In 
both C2 and C3, first-period profits are negative ( p c<% ) but the loss becomes smaller when l increases. 
For low values of l (area C2), the first-period loss is shared by the two firms, as each of them captures half 
of the demand in the first period. For higher levels of l (area C3), the single seller experiences a lower per 
unit loss but a larger overall loss, because it applies to the whole demand (n consumers). In the second 
period, an increase in l has two opposite effects on profits: under duopoly in area C2 (respectively the 
single seller in C3), increasing l results in a higher probability of being present in the second period and 
also a higher probability that the competitor is present (respectively results in a higher probability of being 
present in the second period but lowers the second period price that the single seller can post). These 
competing effects are such that second-period profits are increasing in l in the interval [c/qh, ½] and 
decreasing in the interval [½,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The domestic firm selects strategy expected to be most profitable among (i) no production and 
detection, (ii) production without detection, and (iii) detection and production if high quality. Given the 
price strategies described in the trade liberalization section, the absence of detection results in an expected 
profit PC1=0 if l£ c/qh, PC2 given by equation (16) if c/qh<l£½, and PC3 given by equation (9) if l>½. 
Define the following: 
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/ 1/ 2
1/ 2
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and  
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Detection allows an expected profit PTest given by equation (11), and no production results in a zero profit. 
PC is always positive; however, trade without detection is only possible if consumers expect a nonnegative 
surplus.  
 20 ( ) (2 2 1)
Test h
k n q cP ³ Û < d - l l - l + , (19) 
 
2Test C
k kP ³ P Û < , (20) 
 
ˆˆ
( ) 0SC p ³ Û l ³ l . (21) 
Detection is selected if conditions (19) and (20) are satisfied, which is equivalent to k<k2. Production 
without detection is selected if equation (20) is violated and equation (21) is satisfied. Market closure 
emerges when equations (19) and (21) are violated. This is expressed in Proposition 3.
  
 
Appendix C: Comparison of Domestic Welfare (Based on Figure 3)  
Area Welfare Autarky Welfare Free Trade Change 
A1 0 0 = 
A2 0 n[lqh-c+dl (qh-c)(2-l)] + 
a1 nl(1+d )(qh-c)-k 0 - 
a2 nl(1+d )(qh-c)-k n[lqh-c+dl (qh-c)(2-l)] - 
B1 nl(1+d )(qh-c)-k nl(1+d )(qh-c)-k = 
B’2 nl(1+d)(qh-c)-k nl(1+d)(qh-c)-k = 
b  n[lqh-c+ld (qh-c)] nl(1+d)(qh-c)-k + 
B3 n[lqh-c+ld (qh-c)] n[l(1+d)(qh-c)+(1-l)d (lqh-c+e)]-k + 
C’1 n[lqh-c+ld (qh-c)] n[lqh-c+dl (qh-c)(2-l)] + 
C2 n[lqh-c+ld (qh-c)] n[lqh-c+dl(qh-c)+ ½(1-l)dc] + 
C3 n[lqh-c+ld (qh-c)] n[lqh-c+ld (qh-c)] = 
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